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Among the ongoing debates over ethical implications of artificial-intelligence 
development and applications, AI morality, and the nature of autonomous agency for 
robots, how to think about the moral assumptions implicit in machine-learning capacities 
for so-called companion robots is arguably an urgent one. This project links the 
development of machine-learning algorithmic design with moral-development theory 
language. It argues that robotic algorithmic responses should incorporate language 
linked to higher-order moral reasoning, reflecting notions of universal respect, 
community obligation and justice to encourage similar deliberation among human 
subjects. 
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Robots and intelligent machines are increasingly assisting and often displacing human 
workers in various sectors including manufacturing, finance, education, and health care. 
At first, the robots’ capabilities were limited to helping expedite and standardize 
particular processes, such as enhancing assembly-line processes or augmenting open-
heart surgery. In most contexts, machines were interacting with other machines, and 
human interventions were limited to installing, operating, and fixing them. Advances in 
artificial intelligence, however, have resulted in the proliferation of robots into nearly all 
facets of human private and social life. Human-machine interactions increasingly mimic 
human-human communication, and in some cases, aim to substitute human 
socialization altogether. Some of these changes occur in the health-care industry, 
where human-machine interactions could produce therapeutic and even life-saving 
results. 
The development of intelligent mechanical devices for companionship and care is 
driven in large part by rapidly changing demographics. First, the general population is 
becoming older and living longer (Older People Projected to Outnumber Children, 
2018). Second, as people age, they are more likely to live alone (West et al., 2014). 
Third, older individuals tend to experience mental-health problems at higher rates than 
the general population. In fact, men aged 85 and older are four times more likely to 
commit suicide than younger men (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008). 
Lastly, perhaps as a byproduct of the previous factors, the health-care industry’s need 
for caregivers is expected to grow exponentially in the following decade (Home Health 
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Aides and Personal Care Aides, n.d.). Aiming to capitalize on this opportunity, 
companies have produced intelligent devices, or “robot companions,” capable of 
performing many caregiving and therapeutic tasks. They often provide supervision and 
a sense of companionship to people with particular health and social needs, such as 
children and the elderly. 
The general public reports mixed feelings about introducing robot companions 
into their daily routines. Approximately 40 percent of Americans say they would be 
interested in purchasing a robot caregiver, while close to 60 percent express more 
skepticism about the idea (Smith & Anderson, 2017). Yet despite the public’s cautious 
interest, the robot companion market is projected to become a visible staple of the 
health-care industry. Orders for robot companions increasingly surpass those used for 
logistics and manufacturing (Business Insider, 2015). In fact, the market is expected to 
be worth more than $1.5 billion by 2020, and nearly $2 billion a decade later (Value of 
social and entertainment robot market, n.d.). Because providing certain kinds of health-
care has traditionally depended on human-to-human interaction, the increasing use of 
robots could reshape communication dynamics and socialization.   
While research concerning robot-human interactions spans across decades and 
fields, recent technological advances and the relatively low cost of such devices signal a 
shifting landscape. The development and deployment of robot companions raise serious 
moral questions that have not been adequately explored. What do we mean by morality 
when it comes to machine-learning algorithms? How are issues of value, virtue and 
moral principles factored into machine-learning algorithms that will be “talking” to 
humans with real needs?  What kind of “conversation” will be generated between 
machine-learning androids and humans struggling with loneliness, depression and 
perhaps even tendencies of self-harm or violence toward others? Companion robots are 
being commissioned to replace—not assist—human caregivers, effectively rupturing 
socialization stages for three vulnerable populations: children, the elderly, and the 
mentally disabled. The emergence of this “artificial socialization” raises questions 
concerning how robots affect people’s privacy, ability to socialize, mental and physical 
health, and agency. This phenomenon requires us to consider the moral framework that 
guides what robots are programmed to say to help improve their custodees’ well-being. 
This project aims to propose the incorporation of moral reasoning language and theory 
in the development of machine-learning algorithms, to ensure the likelihood that android 
“talk” emphasizes higher-order moral thinking rather than merely reinforce other anti-
social, self-serving or self-defeating impulses that robots may “hear” from their human 
“patients.” 
Moral-development theory tells us that, through childhood and into emerging 
adulthood (and often beyond), individuals engage in morally immature thinking that 
emphasizes egocentrism, high levels of individualism, and relativistic thinking. As more 
morally developed adults, most individuals tend to grow out of these features and 
recognize value of reciprocity and pro-social behavior. Finally, higher moral thinking 
emphasizes cooperation, social duties, the common good, and the internalization of 
moral principles such as universal respect and justice. Specific language, or moral 
narratives, reflect each of these levels of moral development (Kohlberg, 1971; Rest et 
al., 2000). This project articulates why machine-learning algorithm developers must take 
the language of moral-development theory into account, and it proposes some 
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concretes examples that can “guide” robot-human conversations to emphasize higher-
order moral thinking when it would be advantageous to human subjects to do so.   
 
 
The uncanny valley  
 
Concerns about the rapid integration of artificial beings into social milieus typically 
address aesthetics and, specifically, a robot’s physical resemblance to humans. Mori 
(2012) hypothesizes that, when humans encounter objects that harbor anthropological 
characteristics, they enter an eerie middle-ground called the “uncanny valley,” where 
human appearance and mechanical behavior intersect. In Mori’s “valley,” a humanoid 
object would trigger emotions of unease in human observers. Hence, some robot 
designers argue that pushing robots out of this valley with models that erase the lines 
between human and machine should be a priority. Hiroshi Ishiguro’s work aims to 
achieve this goal and to make robot-human interactions feel as natural as possible for 
people.  
As the director of Intelligent Robotics Laboratory at Osaka University, Ishiguro 
oversees artificial agent designs and programming. Ishiguro’s androids have attracted 
significant attention because of their unique resemblance to humans, including their 
precise replication of body and facial movements. His laboratory refers to these designs 
as “actroids,” androids with visually recognizable human likenesses. Most versions 
typically have been modeled after an average young Japanese woman, and they have 
been programmed to mimic lifelike functions such as blinking, speaking and breathing. 
Some models even use an AI that allows them to respond to physical contact. Ishiguro 
is perhaps notoriously known for designing and carrying around the Geminoid H1, an 
android that looks like him. Like Ishiguro, the Geminoid H1 has a thin build, thick 
eyebrows, piercing black eyes, real black hair plucked from Ishiguro’s scalp, and is 
dressed in a black long-sleeve shirt and black jeans. It mimics breathing, moves his jaw 
and lips to simulate speech, and nods his head, even though it can only perform these 
functions while sitting down. It is operated remotely, and sometimes Ishiguro uses a 
microphone to project his voice unto the Geminoid’s facial movements. The term 
“geminoid,” which Ishiguro coined, stems from geminus, the Latin word for twin. 
Ishiguro indicates that his inventions, particularly the Geminoid H1, help 
researchers understand face-to-face interactions between individuals and artificial 
agents (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). He has stated that he is “genuinely interested in 
knowing how human beings react to being in the presence of a robot” (Guizzo, 2010). 
Ultimately, Ishiguro wishes to design robots that move more naturally—in a less 
“mechanized” way—so that they transcend their uncanniness. When this is 
accomplished, he argues, human beings will be more likely to recognize robots as 
human in certain social contexts (Ishiguro, 2006). For now, companion robots cannot 
convincingly express a range of emotions or move in a non-static way, but they are 
slowly displacing human beings from contexts in which socialization is an important 
aspect (Simon, 2017). Machines, Ishiguro stipulates, have historically improved and 
replaced human abilities, and he is just trying to contribute to this paradigm. Despite 
how human-like Ishiguro’s androids are, they remain trapped in the uncanny valley. 
Ishiguro’s main concerns about his androids and the future of robotics are not 
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necessarily motivated by the ethical implications of their social impact. Rather, he 
focuses on how robot aesthetics elicit various psychological reactions from humans and 
how they can be improved to look (and act) as human as possible. 
 
 
Moral development theory 
 
Jean Piaget’s (1932) studies about how children approached moral dilemmas serve as 
a foundation for the field of moral-development research. His conclusions furthered the 
idea that the development of human moral reasoning is contingent on both cognitive 
changes and external stimuli. Piaget also conceptualized moral development within a 
stage-based model, where the early stages consist of rudimentary ideas of moral 
reasoning and the later stages show more advanced moral judgement. Essentially, in 
Piaget’s view, pre-established cognitions complement and accommodate new 
cognitions. For example, when children apply moral reasoning to differentiate between 
right and wrong, they tend to do so from a lens of self-interest. They recognize that rules 
emerge from a higher (adult) authority and obey them because they fear the severity of 
a hypothetical punishment. When adolescents encounter situations where a distinction 
between right and wrong must be drawn, a consideration of norms and rules 
established by their immediate groups (e.g., family) occurs. They begin to recognize 
that rules may exist to maintain a social order that benefits them. Adults also employ 
moral reasoning contingent on group norms, and some of them exhibit higher levels of 
moral thinking, where rules are assessed and sometimes changed based on their social 
relevance and adherence to universal moral principles.  
Moral development theory chronicles and examines the evolution, as it is shaped 
by cognitive evolution and environmental circumstances, of moral deliberation. Kohlberg 
(1971) built upon Piaget’s findings and expanded his propositions of a stage-based 
moral development process by theorizing that individuals transition from self-interest-
informed moral reasoning to a more socially-conscientious mindset. Kohlberg’s 
theorizing has become a predominant framework through which moral reasoning is 
explained and assessed. A moral psychology survey instrument, the Defining Issues 
Test, is tied to Kohlberg’s theory of six stages of moral development; it has been refined 
and used with hundreds of thousands of subjects over the last four decades to assess 
the moral reasoning levels of various populations. In Kohlberg’s view, individuals 
develop an increasingly sophisticated moral compass that conceptualizes justice as an 
ever-expanding scope of concern for others. The six stages in Kohlberg’s moral 
reasoning are divided as follows: 
 
I. Preconventional level (“pre-moral”).  
At this level, children are aware of cultural norms and interpretations of good and bad, 
but they base their perception of these elements on their self-interest and the 
consequences of actions. A philosophy of quid pro quo and quasi hedonism guides their 
instincts. Additionally, they tend to decide how to act based on the physical power of 
those who create rules.    
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Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience. Young individuals determine what is good 
or bad based on the physical consequences of a particular act. They act in ways to 
avoid punishment. 
Stage 2: Instrumental relativist orientation. Interactions with other individuals are 
assessed within a framework of reciprocity. Actions must satisfy one’s needs (and, 
sporadically, the needs of others) and desires. 
 
II. Conventional level.  
This level finds immediate groups to be of great importance to individual actions. 
Individuals develop a sense of kinship to their groups, and thus, respect for social order, 
its maintenance and justification. Typically, this is the highest level of moral reasoning 
that most adults achieve. 
Stage 3: Interpersonal accordance. Interpretations of right and wrong are 
contingent to a group’s consensus of what is “bad” and “good.” Intention, not 
necessarily consequences, gain currency at this stage. 
Stage 4: Law and order. Individuals feel encouraged to maintain social order by 
following rules set by various groups. Respect for authority and social institutions is 
predominant. 
 
III. Postconventional level.  
Only a limited number of individuals exhibit this type of moral reasoning. People who 
evaluate situations at this stage tend to reevaluate rules and the authority that 
establishes them based on universal moral principles and their value to the common 
good, independent from one’s immediate groups. 
Stage 5: Social contract (within a quasi-utilitarian framework). The possibility of 
changing rules, laws and rights based on their “social utility” and personal “values” 
emerges. Justice inhabits a gray area because individual rights and personal freedom 
are celebrated, as long as they do not infringe on others’ rights. 
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles. All human beings are elevated as individual 
persons with inherent dignity, who are equal and deserve respect. Ethical principles are 
abstract, consistent and harbor a sense of universality. 
Moral psychology researchers have suggested that a number of factors influence 
moral development. The DIT is devoid of gender bias, and level of education, not age, is 
a primary predictor of moral reasoning. On the other hand, religion (Rest et al., 2000; 
Parker, 1990) and political ideology, particularly of individuals with relatively 
conservative views (Rest et al., 2000), tend to predict a low DIT score.  
Moral reasoning is contingent on a variety of factors that human beings are 
exposed to or experience throughout their lives. These include cognitive development, 
group membership and kinship, formation and maintenance of relationships, education, 
political leanings, history of civic participation, religion, and life experience. Theorists 
say moral development operates more like an ecosystem, in which various elements 
interact and change, and less like a step-by-step process. We make decisions 
considering a plethora of lived experiences that manifest in various levels of 
consciousness. With this in mind, it is important to interrogate how a sense of morality 
can be embedded into artificial intelligence.  
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Moral artificial agents for companionship  
 
How do we instill moral responsibility into machines that lack the same cognitive 
development of human beings? Bertolini and Aiello (2018) argue that, first, they should 
be conceptualized as products, not subjects. Robot companions are designed by 
companies focused on finding ways to improve their products and generate profits. 
Considering how many companies operate within a surveillance capitalism framework, 
companion robots could also function as data-gathering devices to both customize 
subject care and feed third party data banks. Second, AI governs and, to some extent, 
limits robot companions’ care capabilities (Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016). Although a 
robot companion programed to assist a diabetic might be able to remind the patient 
about taking insulin, it would not be equipped to show empathy for him. Third, robot 
companions need some kind of moral reasoning language embedded in their 
programing (Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016). However, this issue raises questions about 
how to design morality for a quasi-autonomous agent (UNESCO, 2017). After all, even 
though robots are created with a particular AI that guides their actions, in the end, these 
actions are taken independently from others, based on their previously uploaded 
programing. Lastly, if robot companions require the ability to make decisions as moral 
agents, how do we decide which ethical theory informs their actions? Engineers, 
policymakers, and ethicists will probably disagree on which approach to take and which 
ethical language to embed on an artificial agent (Bogosian, 2017). 
Although the emerging robot companion market has attracted criticism from 
ethicists, much focus has gone to matters of agency, selfhood, deontology, and 
ontology, and less to the actual communicative process with humans and its moral 
dimensions. Because some of these mechanical artifacts care for individuals with 
serious health risks, it is important to examine the actual linguistic choices used to 
provide services. But the responsibility of communicating health-improving messages 
poses numerous ethical challenges for robot companions, their creators, and patients. 
Some robot companions are classified as self-learning machines, which means they are 
programmed to learn from repeated exposure to certain experiences. This modality 
allows them to adapt more easily to changing environments, particularly if the custodee 
suffers from a complex health condition that requires routine data acquisition or 
monitoring. For example, patients with PTSD may require a mechanical companion that 
engages in numerous tasks such as tracking physical movements, contacting loved 
ones or emergency contacts, crafting a conversation to assess moods, and reminding 
them to take medicine. Artificial agents created to perform health-related tasks—or at 
least those currently available in the consumer market—depend on some level of 
machine-human/human-machine interaction to operate adequately. Humans give 
commands or signals to machines so that they recognize a particular need. In turn, 
machines acquire information from humans to customize a pre-programmed service. In 
other words, human-machine engagement increasingly mimics human-human 
communication insofar as two or more agents exchange information. 
While there are numerous health benefits to his capability, it is important to 
emphasize the moral challenges that artificial agents pose. Vallor and Bekey (2017) 
argue that creating robot companions capable of producing and maintaining 
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communication with humans present challenges and opportunities to improve such 
interactions. First, regardless of the accuracy and efficiency of their algorithms, 
machines that intervene in human activities warrant a consistent level of human 
supervision. Both the algorithm-development and human-oversight processes should be 
at least partially available for consumers to access and understand. Of course, there are 
legal limitations to this proposition, because in some cases, both aspects of the 
mechanical architecture of a particular robot may be proprietary. Second, algorithms 
have shown time and again that they harbor human biases that could disadvantage 
certain groups. Credit applications used by financial institutions sometimes consider 
geographic and demographic factors that could exclude people based on ethnicity. For 
example, robot companions operate using algorithmic languages created by people that 
could embed biases against the same populations the robots are designed to assist. 
 
 
Moral language  
 
Clearly, technology has changed the way humans perceive and employ language, and 
how they use language to refer to or address technology. When humans interact with 
machines, they engage in what Coeckelbergh (2017) refers to as “language games”—
that is, associating technology with other elements of our social milieu and treating it as 
such. For example, the zoomorphic characteristics of some robot companions, such as 
PARO and “Joy for All,” which resemble a seal and a dog or cat respectively, may 
endear some humans to speak to them as pets (e.g., “who’s a good boy?”). It is now 
part of the collective lingo to tell someone to “Google” something when they inquire 
about a particular topic. The phrase “Hey, Siri,” commands the iPhone to perform a 
task. Certain virtual health assistants are programmed to recognize words that may 
require professional intervention. In other words, technology shapes the same language 
that mediates our interactions (Coeckelburgh, p. 45, 2017). 
How could we expect robot companions to communicate and execute an 
adequate notion of morality when they are “mindless” agents? La Bossiere (2017) 
argues that to ascribe moral agency to robots, first we must determine if they harbor a 
moral status. Moral status consists, according to him, of an agent’s ability to reason and 
express feelings. Reason, applied to an artificial agent, would encompass 
communicating in a language similar to that of humans. This broader question of moral 
agency is no doubt critical in several areas of AI development. When might it be 
valuable or necessary for the development of a moral “profile” or simulation of moral 
motivation in human-computer interaction? How exactly might these be developed? 
However, this project is not focused on such questions of moral agency, but instead on 
how companion robots might cultivate morally-relevant interactions through machine 
learning, and how we might guide those interactions to reinforce higher-order moral 
thinking when appropriate. As Paula Boddington cautions: 
 
It’s important to remember that AI can take many forms, and be applied in 
many different ways, so none of this is to argue that using AI will be ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’. In some cases, AI might nudge us to improve our approach. But 
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in others, it could reduce or atrophy our approach to important issues. It 
might even skew how we think about values (2019). 
 
Boddington points to the ongoing debate over AI applications in medicine. The potential 
benefits in the development of AI as some sort of “repository for the collective medical 
mind” are enormous: more efficient diagnoses, systematic elimination of dissenting 
opinions. However, theorists caution that allowing this could come at great costs. In our 
tendency to perceive such a tool as infallible, we might well start to foreclose 
independent thought and clinical experience. Moreover, such machine learning could 
even be manipulated to aim for treatment or profit targets that benefit special interests 
rather than patients (Char et al., 2018). Similarly, machine-learning responses to 
morally significant issues or queries by companion robots poses important questions 
about how they might “help” people in a state of distress, despair or contemplating 
harming themselves or others. 
 
 
Artificial moral language applications  
 
Although the robot companion market is projected to grow exponentially in the following 
decades, making some of these devices accessible for many consumers, so far, they 
remain out of reach for the average person. In the meantime, certain apps for iOS play 
the role of either companion or quasi-therapist. Woebot is one of these apps (See 
Figure 1). Its algorithm was fed with cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) language to 
help people cope with mental health issues. Although not intended to substitute a real 




Figure 1. Woebot greets user.  
Source: Woebot App 
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Figure 2. Woebot’s response to a user wanting to “punch their boss” 
Source: Woebot App 
 
When informed that the user feels like “punching his boss,” the app reacts by 
referencing the “mind reading” aspect of CBT, which refers to our tendency to assume 
that we know what others are thinking (See Figure 2). We do not wish to engage with 
the psychological value of Woebot’s recommendation. Rather, we suggest that 




Moral language for AI 
 
Like the Woebot app, whose machine-learning responses are largely based on queries 
designed to encourage more talk and open up spaces for extended deliberation, 
generation of responses informed by moral development theory also would be query-
driven rather than declarative. This reflects the language of the moral reasoning 
assessment instrument, the Defining Issue Test1, which has been used for decades. 
The stage theory of moral development by Kohlberg, detailed earlier, provides the 
theoretical basis for the DIT. James Rest, who developed the DIT, reconceptualized 
Kohlberg’s idea of hard-and-fast stages using schema theory. Rest and colleagues 
(2000) sought to use the term “schemas” instead of “stages” because they view moral 
reasoning as a web of interconnected concepts that can be evoked for different 
situations, rather than a staircase-like progression. Schemas, which are mental 
shortcuts we routinely use to make sense of information and ideas, are based on our 
 
1 The Defining Issues Test is copyrighted and requires permission for use. Those interested in details are directed to 
contact the Center for the Study of Ethical Development at the University of Alabama 
(https://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/). 
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conclusions we’ve made about a relevant idea or issue (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Similarly, 
we have schemas for types of ethical problems, which we draw upon when confronted 
with new dilemmas (Rest et al., 2000). Rest and colleagues theorized that if a person 
has acquired a schema linked to the highest stages of ethical reasoning, statements 
reflecting that stage on the DIT will activate those schemas; otherwise lower-stage 
schemas will be drawn upon. Research over the years has suggested that people can 
generally be identified with one stage in their moral reasoning, but there is fluidity: 
people draw from lower or higher stages as well depending on the situation they 
confront. Consequently, rather than a staircase with discrete steps, moral development 
is best understood as a sliding scale. 
The DIT presents subjects with a series of moral dilemmas; for each dilemma, 
subjects are asked to consider twelve statements or queries that indicate various ways 
of responding to or making judgments about how to resolve the dilemma. Subjects are 
asked first to rate their perceived importance of each item on a five-point scale to their 
thinking about the dilemma. They are then asked to identify and rank what they perceive 
to be the four most important items. For each of the dilemmas, there are statements or 
queries that 1) reflect pre-conventional or conventional moral thinking, 2) post-
conventional or higher-order moral thinking, and 3) non-sensical yet plausible moral 
statements about the dilemma. Researchers can calculate these responses to weed out 
questionable responses (i.e., those who highly rate/rank the non-sensical statements) 
and to assess a P score, which indicates the percentage of responses by subjects that 
reflect higher-order moral thinking. The DIT is a robust instrument that has been used 
with various populations and hundreds of thousands of subjects over the last three 
decades. Its validity has been assessed for multiple demographic and moral-
comprehension criteria cited in more than 400 published articles. The instrument is 
equally valid for males and females, and meta-analyses show that 30 percent to 50 
percent of the variance of DIT scores is attributable to level of education in samples 
ranging from junior high school students to Ph.D. holders. Cronbach’s alphas for items 
reflecting moral reasoning levels are in the upper .70s and low .80s. DIT scores are 
significantly related to cognitive capacity measures of moral comprehension (r= .60), to 
the recall and reconstruction of post-conventional moral arguments, to Kohlberg’s 
measure of moral-development stages, and to other cognitive-developmental measures 
(Center for the Study of Ethical Development). 
 As described earlier, the pre-conventional stages of moral development involve 
egocentric attitudes and approaches to moral issues. They feature relatively immature 
moral motivations such as punishment avoidance, self-justification and gratification as 
an end in itself. Correspondingly, companion robots that encounter such expressions 
from humans they are charged to care for may either, depending on the construction of 
algorithms determining machine-learning processes, reinforce such lower-order moral 
claims or produce responses designed to encourage deeper reflection on them. 
Responses to expressions of despair or depressive states might suggest reflection on 
root causes, for example. Responses to expressions of self-harm or the potential of 
harming others might redirect focus from individual-level grievances to broader 
implications of well-bring and feelings that violence is a justifiable response to problems. 
Post-conventional, or higher-order moral reasoning, shifts the focus of moral 
deliberation from the self to social and community obligations. Whereas pre-
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conventional reasoning emphasizes utility (“How would this affect me?” “What might I 
get out of doing/not doing X?”), post-conventional deliberation is driven by broader 
priorities of Kantian duties that ensure respectful treatment of others, as well as 
Aristotelian questions about what it means to be socially responsible and how behaviors 
might promote or undermine flourishing for all. Items in the DIT reflecting higher stages 
of moral development, for example, include emphasize questions that transcend 
concerns of individual-level benefit involved in the scenarios, and shift focus to social 
implications and precedents of honoring obligations to the broader human community. 
For example, a DIT scenario involves a question of hiring an auto mechanic whose 
Chinese ethnicity might drive away prejudiced customers. Among the items reflecting 
higher-order moral reasoning include: 
▪ “What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how society’s rules 
are filled?” 
▪ “Whether hiring capable men such as Mr. Lee would use talents that would 
otherwise be lost to society.” 
Another scenario features a terminal, suffering patient who begs her doctor to provide 
enough morphine to allow her to overdose. Among the items reflecting higher-order 
moral reasoning include: 
▪ “Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don’t 
want to live?” 
▪ “Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals 
who want to live?” 
Note that no items are intended to “guide” subjects to a particular conclusion, but reflect 
the essence of ethics: what matters is not the final decision made, but the level of 
informed reasoning and the prioritized values that define the deliberation. Similarly, 
rather than assigning “judgment” statements to ranges of subject expressions, machine-
learning algorithms for companion units should weight expressions on an individualistic-
moral/social obligation spectrum with appropriate responses that focus on qualities 
featured on one end of that spectrum and not the other. Algorithmic responses should 
emphasize human dignity and flourishing with statements that ask subjects to talk about 




Machine learning and virtue theory 
 
The project has aimed to introduce moral-development theory to the realm of machine-
learning algorithm construction, and argue for its usefulness in considering the range of 
interaction goals for companion units. Language associated with higher-order moral 
reasoning emphasizes notions of universal respect and dignity and community 
belonging and obligation. It is premised on an expansive vision of justice. As such, it 
arguably draws less from a consequentialist, or utilitarian, ethical framework, and 
emphasizes principles from deontological and Aristotelian ethics. This emphasis will 
necessarily vary by machine-learning functionalities; in the realm of AI and self-driving 
vehicles, for example, it is difficult to envision what algorithms aimed at promoting a 
sense of Kantian duty or cultivating virtuous characters would look like. The aim, 
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instead, is rightly the justifiable calculation of outcomes: how exactly AI-equipped 
vehicles would be programmed to prioritize drivers, passengers, or bystanders in 
collision scenarios, and execute emergency maneuvers accordingly, for example. But 
for machine-learning programs likely to confront less concrete situations, such as 
despairing, anxious or depressed patients, weighing various possible “outcomes” is 
arguably less central. The emphases on relations, connections, duties and virtues found 
in moral-development theory offer a more compelling foundation for robot 
companionship. The emphasis on virtue ethics frameworks, especially, comports with 
trends in moral psychology research (including studies on moral-reasoning) more 
broadly speaking: The study of the links among identity, moral motivation, theories of 
the self, value internalization, ethical ideology, and a host of other components of the 
moral self lends itself to a neo-Aristotelian framework emphasizing cultivation of 
character and embodiment of the virtues. Moral psychology scholar and bestselling 
author Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues have written eloquently on this point. While 
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